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In this paper, we investigate the discount allocation problem in social networks. It has been reported that
40% of consumers will share an email offer with their friend and 28% of consumers will share deals via
social media platforms. What does this mean for a business? Essentially discounts should not just be treated
as short term solutions to attract individual customer, instead, allocating discounts to a small fraction of
users (called seed users) may trigger a large cascade in a social network. This motivates us to study the
influence maximization discount allocation problem: given a social network and budget, we need to decide
to which initial set users should offer the discounts, and how much should the discounts be worth. Our goal
is to maximize the number of customers who finally adopt the target product. We investigate this problem
under both non-adaptive and adaptive settings. In the first setting, we have to commit the set of seed users
and corresponding discounts all at once in advance. In the latter case, the decision process is performed
in a sequential manner, and each seed user that is picked provides the feedback on the discount, or, in
other words, reveals whether or not she will adopt the discount. We propose a simple greedy policy with
an approximation ratio of 1
2
(1− 1/e) in non-adaptive setting. For the significantly more complex adaptive
setting, we propose an adaptive greedy policy with bounded approximation ratio in terms of expected utility.
Key words : approximation algorithm; team formation; cover decomposition
1. Introduction
With the rapid expansion of World Wide Web in the last two decades, social networks
are becoming important dissemination and marketing platforms as they allow the efficient
generation, dissemination, and sharing of information and ideas. And platforms utilizing
social media have been recognized as revolutionizing communication channels for corpora-
tions and consumers alike. Consider the following scenario. Suppose a firm would like to
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generate demand for a new product through a social network, they may choose to provide
discounts to a few selected users in the network, and hope that they promote this product
to their friends as well. This is different from traditional discount allocation strategy whose
central problem is to find the “best fit” between a discount and a given user while ignoring
the network effect of that user. Our work fundamentally differs from existing works as we
are concerned with the network value of users when making allocations. Suppose the total
discount is constrained by a budget defined by the firm, this raises the question: given the
structure of the social networks and the knowledge of how the new product adoption dif-
fuse through the network, which initial set users should be selected to receive the discount?
and how much should the discounts be worth?
To this end, we formulate and investigate the discount allocation problem as follows.
Given a social network G= (V,E), where V is a set of individuals and E is a set of social
ties. Our model decomposes the cascade process into two stages: seeding stage and diffusion
stage. In the seeding stage, we offer discounts to a set of initial users. Each type of discount
stands for a specific dollar amount off of the purchase. Some initial users accept the offer
and act as starting points, called seeds, in the diffusion stage. It is reasonable to assume
that the adoption probability of any initial user is monotonically increasing with respect
to discount rate. In the diffusion stage, the adoption propagates from the seeds to other
users. In order to model the diffusion dynamics in a social network, we can leverage the
existing results done in diffusion of information in social networks. In particular, we adopt
independent cascade model (Kempe et al. 2003), which is one of the most commonly used
models. Our goal is to find the optimal configuration, which consists of a set of initial users
and discount rate for each user, that maximizes the cascade in expectation. We study this
problem under both non-adaptive and adaptive settings.
• In the non-adaptive setting, we have to commit the set of initial users and correspond-
ing discounts all at once in advance. Although this setting is similar to traditional influence
maximization problem, a unique challenge of our problem is to model the responses from
the customer with respect to different discount rates. In particular, our model should be
able to incorporate the following two constraints: (a) If a user receives multiple discounts,
her decision on whether or not to accept the offer only depends on highest discount rate,
and (b) Given that an initial user accepts a discount, she will accept all discounts with
higher rate. We prove that the utility function under this setting is monotone and sub-
modular, which admits a 1
2
(1− 1/e)-approximation algorithm.
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• Under the significantly more complex adaptive setting, the decision process is per-
formed in a sequential manner, and each initial user that is picked provides the feedback
on the discount rate, or, in other words, reveals whether or not she will adopt the discount.
The action taken in each step depends on the actual cascade that happens in the previous
steps. Therefore any feasible solutions are now policies instead of a fixed configuration.
It was worth noting that our problem is closely related to adaptive/stochatic submodular
maximization, however, there are two significant differences between the two: first of all,
existing studies mainly assume that the cost of the action is known to the algorithm before
the action is taken. However, this assumption is no longer valid under our setting, i.e, the
actual amount of discount that has been delivered to a initial user depends on whether or
not she accepts the offer; secondly, actions may incur non-uniform cost, this is obviously
true since different discounts has different value. Unfortunately, existing solutions can not
handle the above two challenges. In this work, we prove that the utility function is adaptive
monotone and adaptive submodular, this allows us to develop a novel greedy policy with
bounded approximation ratio.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to systematically study the problem of
discount allocation in both non-adaptive and adaptive settings. Under independent cascade
model, which is one of the most commonly used models in literature, we present a detailed
analysis of the computational complexity of the problem. We propose a simple greedy
algorithm with a constant approximation ratio in non-adaptive setting. We also develop a
series of adaptive policies with bounded approximation ratios under the adaptive setting.
2. Related Work
Domingos and Richardson (2001) pointed out that data mining plays an important role
in helping companies determine which potential customers to market to. Their work high-
lighted the importance of a customer’s network value which is derived from her influence
on other users. We discuss related work on two related topics. First topic is on the study of
non-adaptive influence maximization problem: given a social network, how to find a set of
influential customers in order to trigger a large cascade of adoptions. Kempe et al. (Kempe
et al. 2003) formulated the influence maximization problem under two diffusion models,
namely Independent Cascade model and Linear Threshold model. Since then, considerable
work (Chen et al. 2013)(Leskovec et al. 2007)(Cohen et al. 2014)(Chen et al. 2010)(Chen
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et al. 2009) has been devoted to extending existing models to study influence maximization
and its variants, but almost all these works assume no uncertainty in the realization of seed
set, i.e., any node that has been targeted will become seed or accept the offer immediately.
Eftekhar et al. (Eftekhar et al. 2013) relaxed this assumption by assuming that the prob-
ability that a user becomes a seed user is given and fixed. In this work, we introduce the
concept of adoption probability to capture the probability that a targeted user will accept
the discount, based on the value of the discount and her own interest profile, i.e., the prior
probability that the user will accept the discount in the absence of any social proof. Lastly,
we mention the work by Yang et al. (2016) on continuous influence maximization. While
they also study how to offer discounts to social users in order to trigger large cascades, our
settings are very different. First of all, they assume a continuous adoption function whereas
we adopt a discrete function to capture the adoption probability. More importantly, from
a theoretical perspective, we prove approximation guarantees for our approach. Secondly,
their work mainly focuses on non-adaptive setting while our work covers both non-adaptive
and adaptive settings. We propose a novel adaptive policy with bounded approximation
ratio.
The second topic is on adaptive/stochastic submodular maximization (Golovin and
Krause 2011, Badanidiyuru et al. 2016). Our work departs from the body of work in this
field in two ways: first of all, existing studies mainly assume that the cost of the action is
known to the algorithm before the action is taken. However, this assumption is no longer
valid under our setting, i.e, the actual amount of discount that has been delivered depends
on whether or not the targeted user accepts the offer; secondly, actions may incur non-
uniform cost, due to different discount values. Unfortunately, existing solutions can not
handle the above two challenges. In this work, we develop a novel greedy adaptive policy
with constant approximation ratio.
3. Network Model and Diffusion Process
A social network is modeled as a directed graph G = (V,E), where V is a set of users
and E is a set of social ties. Our model decomposes the cascade into two stages: seeding
and diffusion. In the seeding stage, the initial set of users and corresponding discounts
are decided for each initial user. The initial set of users who accept the discount act as
starting points, called seed users, in the diffusion stage. In the diffusion stage, starting from
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seed users, the adoption propagates across the entire social network according to certain
propagation model. Below we describe the details of these two stages.
• Seeding stage: Given the initial set of users and corresponding discount rate, each
initial user decides whether or not to accept the offer. Although this decision may be
affected by various factors, including the discount rate and user’s attributes and behaviors
(demographics, shopping history), it is reasonable to assume that the adoption probability
of any initial user is monotonically increasing with respect to discount. Assume there are
m possible discount rates D= {d1, · · · , dm}, each user v ∈ V is associated with an adoption
probability function pv : di→ [0,1], which models the probability that v accepts the offer
given a discount greater than or equal to di. It is clearly true that pv(di)≥ pv(dj) for any
v and discounts di ≥ dj. Estimating the adoption probability itself is a very important and
challenging task, it has been well studied in the field of marketing. Interested readers may
refer to (Brennan 1995)(Suh et al. 2004) for further information. It is easy to verify that
the above adoption model satisfies the following two conditions:
Definition 1 (Dominant Condition). If a user receives multiple discounts, her deci-
sion on whether or not to accept the offer only depends on the one with highest rate.
Definition 2 (Monotonic Condition). Given that a user has accepted a discount,
she will accept any discount with higher rate.
It was worth noting that all results derived in this work apply to any adoption model
that is dominant and monotonic.
• Diffusion stage: Every initial user who decides to adopt the discount becomes the
seed in the following diffusion stage, and starts to propagate the product to her neigh-
bors across the social network. There are many ways to model the cascades in the social
network, we adopt independent cascade model (Kempe et al. 2003), which is one of the
most commonly used models, to model the diffusion dynamics in a social network. Under
independent cascade model, each edge (u, v) in the graph is associated with a propagation
probability puv, which is the probability that node u independently influences node v in the
next step after u is influenced. Then given a set of seeds U , the independent cascade model
works as follows: Let Ut ⊆ V denote the set of influenced nodes at step t with U0 =U . At
step t+ 1, every user v ∈ Ut may influence her out-neighbors v ∈ V \ ∪0≤i≤t−1Ui with an
independent probability pvu. This process ends at t with Ut = ∅. The expected cascade of
U , which is the expected number of influenced nodes given seed set U , is denoted as I(U).
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4. Problem Formulation
4.1. Non-adaptive Setting
Given the set of users V and possible discount rates D, define H, V ×D as the solution
space, probing seed-discount (s-d) pair h= 〈v(h),d(h)〉 ∈H translates to offering d(h)∈D
to user v(h)∈ V . We use S ⊆H to denote a configuration of discounts assigned to a subset
of initial users in V . Please note that it is feasible to assign multiple discounts to the same
user, however, since her adoption decision only depends on the highest discount (due to
dominant condition), it suffice to use the highest discount as a representative. Let dS [v]
denote the highest discount assigned to v under S. Define dS [w] = 0 if w has not been
selected as a initial user under S, i.e, there is no h ∈ S with v(h) = w. Given a social
network G= (V,E) and a configuration S, the probability that a subset of users U ⊆ V of
the users is the seed set is
Pr(U ;V ;S) =
∏
u∈U
pu(dS [u])
∏
v∈V \U
(1− pv(dS [v]))
As introduced earlier, we use I(U) to denote the expected cascade under seed set U , then
the expected cascade under configuration S is
f(S) =
∑
U∈2V
Pr(U ;V ;S) · I(U)
Now we define the non-adaptive discount allocation problem (NDA) studied in this paper
as follows. Given a social network G, a propagation probability puv for every edge (u, v), a
budget B, a seed probability function pu : di→ [0,1] for every user u and rate di, find the
configuration S that is the optimal solution to the following optimization problem.
NDA: Maximize f(S)
subject to: {
∀v ∈ V, dS [v]∈D∑
v∈V dS [v]≤B
Although this setting is similar to traditional influence maximization problem, a unique
challenge here is to model the responses from the user with respect to different discount
rates. Notice that the budget constraint specified above ensures that the worst-case cost is
bounded below by B. It is also reasonable to replace this hard constraint by other forms of
constraint such as a soft constraint on the expected cost:
∑
v∈V dS [v] · pv(dS [v])≤B. Our
results are general enough to apply to both cases.
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Figure 1 A toy social network. Possible discounts: D = {1,2}; propagation probabilities are reported on edges;
adoption probabilities: ∀u∈ {a, b, c, d, e} : pu(1) = 0.5, pu(2) = 1; budget B = 2.
For our example we use the toy social network in Fig. 1. In this example, there are five
users V = {a, b, c, d, e}, adoption probabilities and propagation probabilities (on edges) are
reported in the figure. Let us consider two ways of allocating discounts to users. The first
one is S1 = {a,2}, i.e., allocating 2 to a: under S1, a accepts the offer with probability
pa(2) = 1; b and c will be influenced with probability 0.2; d will be influenced with prob-
ability 1− (1− 0.2× 0.5)2 = 0.19; e will be influenced with probability 0.19× 0.1 = 0.019.
The expected cascade size under S1 is f(S1) = 1 + 0.2 × 2 + 0.19 + 0.019 = 1.609. Con-
sider the second allocation S2 = {a,1, b,1}, i.e., allocation 1 to a and b: under S2, a (resp.
b) accepts the offer with probability pa(1) = 0.5 (resp. pb(1) = 0.5); c is influenced with
probability 0.5× 0.2 = 0.1; d is influenced with probability 1− (1− 0.5)(1− 0.1) = 0.55;
e is influenced with probability 0.55× 0.1 = 0.055. The expected cascade size under S2 is
f(S2) = 0.5+0.5+0.1+0.55+0.055 = 1.705. Therefore S2 leads to larger expected cascade
than S1.
4.2. Adaptive Setting
Different from the previous setting where we have to commit the set of initial users and
corresponding discounts all at once in advance, under the adaptive setting, the decision
process is performed in a sequential manner. Each initial user that is probed provides her
feedback on the discount rate, or, in other words, reveals whether or not she will adopt
the discount. The action taken in each step depends on the actual cascade that happens in
the previous steps and remaining budget. Therefore any feasible solutions are now policies
instead of a fixed configuration.
Definition 3 (Seeding Realization). For every configuration h, v(h) is either in
“accept” state (h→ 1) or in “reject” state (h→ 0), describing whether v(h) accepts d(h)
Tang et al.: Going viral: Optimizing Discount Allocation in Social Networks for Influence Maximization
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or not. We represent the state of the seeding stage using function φ : H→ [0,1], called
seeding realization.
Definition 4 (Diffusion Realization). For every edge (u, v) ∈ E, it is either in
“live” state or in “blocked” state. (describing whether the propagation through (u, v) is a
success or not). We represent the state of the diffusion stage using function ψ :E→ [0,1],
called diffusion realization.
After probing a s-d pair h we are able to obtain the seeding realization, i.e., v(h) decides
wether or not to accept d(h). If v(h) decides to accept the discount, we further get to see
the realization of the diffusion stage, i.e., the status (live or dead) of all edges exiting v(h),
for all nodes v reachable from v(h) via live edges social network i.e., reachable from v(h)
under ψ. After each attempt of probing, our observations so far can be represented as a
partial realization 〈φp,ψp〉.
Definition 5 (Adaptive Policy). We define our adaptive policy pi : 〈φp,ψp〉 → H,
which is a function from the current “observation” 〈φp,ψp〉 to H, specifying which s-d pair
to pick next under a particular set of observations, e.g., pi chooses s-d pair given s-d pairs
have been probed so far, and the resulting cascade.
Assume there is a known prior probability distribution p(φ) := P [Φ = φ] (and p(ψ) :=
P [Ψ =ψ] resp.) over seeding realizations (and diffusion realizations resp.). Given a realiza-
tion 〈φ,ψ〉, let H(pi;φ,ψ) denote all s-d pairs picked by pi under 〈φ,ψ〉, and c(H(pi;φ,ψ))
denote the total amount of discount that have been delivered by pi under 〈φ,ψ〉. The
expected cascade of a policy pi is f(pi) = E[f(H(pi; Φ,Ψ)|Φ,Ψ)] where the expectation is
taken with respect to p(φ) and p(ψ). The goal of the Adaptive Coupon Distribution (ACD)
problem is to find a policy pi such that
ACD: Maximize f(pi)
subject to:
c(H(pi;φ,ψ))≤B,∀φ,ψ
For our example we use the toy social network in Fig. 2, all settings of this example are
identical to Fig. 1. Consider a possible adaptive policy as follows: We first probe 〈a,1〉,
that is offering discount 1 to user a, and observe the following partial seeding realiza-
tion: φ(〈a,1〉) = 1, i.e., a accepts the offer; and partial diffusion realization: ψ(ab) = 1 and
ψ(ac) = 0, i.e., user b is influenced by a, user c has not been influenced. In the second step
where the remaining budget is 1, we probe 〈c,1〉, that is offering discount 1 to user c and
Tang et al.: Going viral: Optimizing Discount Allocation in Social Networks for Influence Maximization
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Figure 2 Step 1: pick 〈a,1〉; step2: pick 〈c,1〉; step 3: pick 〈d,1〉.
obtain the following seeding realization: φ(〈c,1〉) = 0, i.e., user c does not accept the offer.
In the third step where the remaining budget is still 1, we probe 〈d,1〉, that is offering
discount 1 to user d, and observe that φ(〈d,1〉) = 1, i.e., user d has accepted this offer, and
ψ(de) = 1, i.e., e has been influenced by d. Thus the number of influenced users is 4.
5. Non-Adaptive Discount Allocation Problem
In this section, we study non-adaptive discount allocation problem. Our main idea is to
prove that the influence function f(·) is monotone and submodular, exploiting these prop-
erties, a simple greedy algorithm can achieve 1
2
(1− 1/e) approximation ratio.
Definition 6 (Submodular function). Consider an arbitrary function z(·) that
maps subsets of a finite ground set Ω to non-negative real numbers. We say that z(·) is
submodular if it satisfies a natural “diminishing returns” property: the marginal gain from
adding an element to a set S is at least as high as the marginal gain from adding the same
element to a superset of S. Formally, a submodular function satisfies the follow property:
For every X,Y ⊆Ω with X ⊆ Y and every x∈Ω\Y , we have that
z(X ∪{x})− z(X)≥ z(Y ∪{x})− z(Y )
We say a submodular function z is monotone if z(X)≤ z(Y ) whenever X ⊆ Y .
To prove that the influence function f(·) is monotone and submodular, we need to focus
on the value of f(S ∪h)− f(S), for arbitrary sets S ⊆H and s-d pair h. Since the increase
of the above expression is very difficult to analyze directly, we take an equivalent view of
the cascade process by decomposing it into two realizations:
1. seeding realization φ. Consider a point in the seeding stage when h= 〈v, d〉 is probed,
i.e, node v has been offered discount d, v accepts offer and becomes the seed with probability
pv(d). We can view the outcome of this random event as being determined by comparing
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pv(d) with a random number g that is uniformly selected from [0,1]: if pv(d) ≥ g, then
h= 〈v, d〉 is declared to be valid under φ.
2. diffusion realization ψ. We follow the same approach introduced in (Kempe et al.
2003) to model the diffusion dynamics. In particular, for each edge (u, v) in the graph, a
coin of bias puv is flipped at the very beginning of the process. The edges for which the
coin flip indicated an successful activation are declared to be live in ψ; the remaining edges
are declared to be blocked in ψ. As described in detail later, a user is influenced if it can
be reached from some seed through a path consisting of live edges.
Similar to the diffusion realization, where the coin can be flipped at the beginning of the
process, the seeding realization can also be performed ahead of the actual seeding stage.
In particular, for each node u, a random number gu is uniformly selected from [0,1]: if
there exists a h ∈H with v(h) = u and d(h)≥ gu, then v(h) is declared to be live under
discount d(h). Given a configuration S ⊆ H and a seeding realization φ, we say a node
v(h) is live under S and φ if and only if there exists h ∈ S such that v(h) is live with
discount d(h). With both seeding and diffusion realizations are performed in advance, it
is easy to determine the subset of nodes that can be influenced at the end of the cascade
process:
Claim 1. Given a configuration S and realization 〈φ,ψ〉, a node u ends up influenced
if and only if u is live or there is a path from some live node to u consisting entirely of
live edges.
Theorem 1. The influence function f(·) is submodular.
Proof: We first prove that for each fixed realization 〈φ,ψ〉, the function f(·) is submodular.
We use f(·|φ,ψ) to denote the (deterministic) influence function under a fixed realization
〈φ,ψ〉. Let A and B be two configurations such that A⊆B, and consider the value f(A∪
{h}|φ,ψ) − f(A|φ,ψ), this is the number of users that can be reached by live users in
A∪{h} but not in A. This number is at least as large as the number of users that can be
reached by live users in B∪{h} but not in B. It implies that f(A∪{h}|φ,ψ)−f(A|φ,ψ)≥
f(B ∪ {h}|φ,ψ)− f(B|φ,ψ) Then due to the fact that a non-negative linear combination
of submodular functions is also submodular, f(·) is also submodular. 
We next propose a hill-climbing algorithm (Algorithm 1) with a constant approximation
ratio. Our algorithm computes two candidate sets: The first candidate set contains a single
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s-d pair which can maximize the expected cascade: S1 = {h∗} where h∗ = arg maxh f({h});
the second candidate solution S2 is computed by greedy algorithm in which we always add
h that can maximize the expected incremental marginal gain with respect to the discount
rate: f(S2∪{h})
d(h)
until the budget constraint is violated. Then we choose the better one as the
final output S. It was worth noting that computing f(S) is #P-hard (Chen et al. 2010),
and is typically approximated by numerous Monte Carlo simulations, however, running
such simulations are extremely time consuming. Instead, we can leverage a FPRAS (Fully
Polynomial Randomized Approximation Scheme) (Long and Wong 2011) for estimating
f(S). Based on (Khuller et al. 1999) and the submodularity of f(·), we can prove that our
greedy algorithm achieves 1
2
(1− e−1)-approximation.
Algorithm 1 Hill-Climbing Algorithm
1: S1 : h∗ = arg maxh f({h}); S2 := ∅;
2: while d(S2)≤B do
3: S2← arg maxh∈H f(S2∪{h})d(h) ; H=H\{h}
4: return arg maxS∈{S1,S2} f(S)
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 achieves approximation ratio 1
2
(1− e−1).
6. Adaptive Discount Allocation Problem
We next study the adaptive discount allocation problem. In the rest of this paper, let
f(pi|φ) (resp. f(pi|ψ)), as a shorthand notation for f(pi|φ,Ψ) (resp. f(pi|Φ,ψ)), denote the
expected cascade of pi under a fixed seeding realization φ (resp. a fixed diffusion realization
ψ).
6.1. Greedy Policy
We first propose a adaptive greedy policy with bounded approximation ratio.
6.1.1. Policy Description Our greedy policy is performed in a sequential manner as
follows: In each round, we probe the s-d pair, say h∗, that maximizes ratio of conditional
expected marginal benefit to cost. If v(h∗) accepts d(h∗), we deduct the discount from the
budget and remove v(h∗) from consideration in the following rounds. Otherwise, if v(h∗)
turns down the discount, we simply discard h∗ and move to the next round. This process
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iterates until either the budget is used up or all nodes have been probed at the highest dis-
count rate. The detailed description is listed in Algorithm 2: Given partial diffusion realiza-
tion ψp, let dom(ψp) denote all influenced users under ψp, we use G[V \dom(ψp)] to denote
the induced graph of V \ dom(ψp). Let ∆(h|ψp) = IG[V \dom(ψp)](v(h)) denote the expected
marginal benefit of v(h) in G[V \ dom(ψp)] conditioned on v(h) has become the seed. At
beginning of each round, we check whether or not there exists h∈H such that d(h)≤B. If
so, probe h∗ = arg maxh∈H∆(h|ψp)/d(h) subject to d(h)≤B. Depending on the response
from the v(h∗), we either commit v(h∗) and deduct d(h∗) from the remaining budget or
skip to the next round.
Algorithm 2 Greedy Policy
1: S = ∅
2: while B ≥ 0 do
3: if there exists h∈H such that d(h)≤B then
4: probe h∗ = arg maxh∈H∆(h|ψp)/d(h) subject to d(h)≤B
5: if v(h∗) accepts d(h∗) then
6: S ←S ∪{h∗}; B←B−d(h∗);
7: H←H\{h|v(h) = v(h∗)};
8: update ψp;
9: else
10: H←H\{h∗}
11: else
12: break.
13: return S
We next walk through this greedy policy using Fig. 2. We first probe 〈a,1〉 since it has
the highest benefit-to-cost ratio I({a})
1
. We observe that a accepts the offer and successfully
influenced b. Conditioned on the above observation, we next probe 〈c,1〉 because it has
the highest benefit-to-cost ratio in G[V \ {a, b}], and we observe that c turns down the
offer. Then we probe 〈d,1〉 which has the highest benefit-to-cost ratio in G[V \ {a, b, c}],
and observe that d has accepted the offer and successfully influenced e.
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6.1.2. Performance Analysis We first study a relaxed version of ADA by assuming
that the seeding realization is pre-known. Given a seeding realization φ, each node v is
associated with a minimum discount dv at which v can become the seed. If dv will never
become the seed under φ, then dv =∞. Since it is meaningless to probe a user v with any
discount lower or higher than dv, we use Hrelaxed = {〈v, dv〉|v ∈ V } to denote the refined
solution space under this relaxed setting. Consider a greedy policy pigreedyrelaxed as follows: In each
round, update the partial diffusion realization ψp, and probe h ∈Hrelaxed that maximizes
∆(h|ψp)/dv(h). This process iterates until either the budget is used up or all users have
been probed.
Lemma 1. Under the relaxed setting, given any seeding realization φ, the greedy policy
pigreedyrelaxed obtains at least (1− e−(B−dmax)/B) of the value of the best policy pi∗relaxed.
f(pigreedyrelaxed|φ)≥ (1− e−(B−dmax)/B)f(pi∗relaxed|φ)
Proof: Consider two types of seeding realizations depending on the output of pigreedy: 1. φa:
all users except those whose minimum discount is ∞ have become the seeds; 2. φb: there
exists some user with finite minimum discount that can not be included in the solution
due to limited budget.
The first case is trivial, because both pigreedyrelaxed and pi
∗
relaxed must select all possible seeds,
f(pigreedyrelaxed|φa) = f(pi∗relaxed|φa) (1)
We next focus on the second case: In Theorem 26 (Golovin and Krause 2011), it has
been proved that
f(pi[l])≥ (1− e−l/k)f(pi∗[k])
where pi[l] denotes the greedy policy with expected budget l and pi
∗
[k] denotes the best policy
with expected budget k. The above result is applicable to the traditional influence maxi-
mization problem without considering seeding stage. Taking seeding stage into account, it
is easy to extend this result to show that f(pigreedyrelaxed|φb)≥ f(pi[B−dmax]|φb) and f(pi∗relaxed|φb)≥
f(pi[B]|φb), this is because the actual cost of pigreedyrelaxed is lower bounded by B− dmax, and the
actual cost of pi∗ is upper bounded by B. It follows that
f(pigreedyrelaxed|φb)≥ (1− e−(B−dmax)/B)f(pi∗relaxed|φb) (2)
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Eqs. (1) and (2) together imply that, for all seeding realization φ, we have
f(pigreedyrelaxed|φ)≥ (1− e−(B−dmax)/B)f(pi∗relaxed|φ)

Surprisingly, we next show that given any realization 〈φ,ψ〉, the outputs of pigreedy and
pigreedyrelaxed are identical.
Lemma 2. Given any realization 〈φ,ψ〉, the outputs of pigreedy and pigreedyrelaxed are identical.
Proof: Recall that under pigreedy, we probe h∗ = arg maxh∈H∆(h|ψ)/d(h) in each round.
Depending on the response from the v(h∗), we either commit h∗ or skip to the next round.
We next show that by following pigreedy, if v(h∗) accepts h∗, then d(h∗) = dv(h∗), i.e., pigreedy
will never probe a user with discount higher than her minimum discount. First, it is trivial
to verify dv(h∗) ≤ d(h∗) due to the definition of dv(h∗). We can also prove that otherwise, we
can probe v(h∗) with discount dv(h∗) which is lower than d(h∗), leading to higher benefit-
to-cost ratio. This contradicts to the assumption that h∗ = arg maxh∈H∆(h|ψ)/d(h).
We are now ready to prove that the outputs of pigreedy and pigreedyrelaxed are identical. Let St
denote the first t seeds committed by pigreedy, we prove this result through induction on
t. The basic case when t= 0, i.e., S0 = ∅ is trivial. As proved above, when v(h∗) accepts
h∗, we have dv(h∗) = d(h∗). Therefore, the first seed that pigreedy and pi
greedy
relaxed commit must
be some user v that maximizes I({v})/dv. Assume by contradiction that pigreedy commits
some user other than v, then probing v with discount less than or equal to dv leads to
a higher benefit-to-cost ratio. This causes contradiction to the design of pigreedy. Assume
the first k users committed by pigreedy and pigreedyrelaxed are identical, we next prove that the
(k+1)-th seed is also identical. Given the partial observation ψp after the first k seeds have
been committed, the next s-d pair that pigreedy commits must be some h that maximizes
∆(h|ψp)/dv(h), otherwise, probing v(h) with discount less than or equal to dv(h) leads to
a higher benefit-to-cost ratio. Therefore, pigreedy and pigreedyrelaxed commit the same set of seeds.
This finishes the proof of this lemma. 
Theorem 3. The greedy policy pigreedy obtains at least (1− e−(B−dmax)/B) of the value of
the best policy pi∗.
f(pigreedy)≥ (1− e−(B−dmax)/B)f(pi∗)
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Proof: We have proved that f(pigreedyrelaxed|φ) ≥ (1− e−(B−dmax)/B)f(pi∗relaxed|φ) for all φ. Based
on the definition of f(pi∗relaxed|φ), we have f(pi∗relaxed|φ)≥ f(pi∗|φ). Thus,
f(pigreedyrelaxed|φ)≥ (1− e−(B−dmax)/B)f(pi∗relaxed|φ)≥ (1− e−(B−dmax)/B)f(pi∗|φ)
Then together with Lemma 2, we have
f(pigreedy|φ) = f(pigreedyrelaxed|φ)≥ (1− e−(B−dmax)/B)f(pi∗relaxed|φ)≥ (1− e−(B−dmax)/B)f(pi∗|φ)
It follows that
f(pigreedy|Φ)≥ (1− e−(B−dmax)/B)f(pi∗|Φ)
This finishes the proof of this theorem. 
We observe that the above greedy heuristic has an unbounded approximation ratio in
the worst case. Consider, for example, a network consists of n nodes: one isolated node x
and a clique with size n−1. There are two discount rates D= {1/n,1}, and budget is 1. We
further set px(1/n) = px(1) = 1, and py(1/n) = 0, py(1) = 1,∀y ∈ V \{x}. Assume I({x}) = 1
and I({y}) = n− 1,∀y ∈ V \ {x}. By following the heuristics, we will provide discount 1/n
to x, reaching 1 user in expectation. However, the best strategy is to provide discount 1
to any user except x, reaching cascade n−1 in expectation. Thus the approximation ratio
in this case is as large as n.
6.2. Enhanced Greedy Policy
We next show that a small modification to the heuristic can achieve an approximation
ratio independent of n. Our policy (Algorithm 3) first computes two candidate solutions:
The first candidate solution contains a single node v∗ which can maximize the expected
cascade given that v∗ has become the seed: v∗ = arg maxv∈V I({v}); the second candidate
solution is computed by the greedy policy. Then we choose the one that leads to larger
expected cascade as the final solution.
Theorem 4. Let v∗ = arg maxv∈V I({v}) and dmax denote the highest discount rate, our
enhanced greedy policy pienhanced obtains at least pv∗(dmax) · (1− e−1)/2 of the value of the
best policy pi∗ for the Adaptive Coupon Distribution problem with the independent cascade
model.
f(pienhanced)≥ pv∗(dmax) · (1− e
−1)
2
· f(pi∗)
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Algorithm 3 Enhanced Greedy Policy pienhanced
1: Let v∗ = arg maxv∈V I({v});
2: if pv∗(dmax) · I({v∗})> f(pigreedy) then
3: offer dmax to v
∗;
4: else
5: call pigreedy
Proof: Similar to proof of Theorem 3, we consider two types of realizations φa and φb.
We first prove that the following equality holds under φa: f(pigreedy|φa) = f(pi∗|φa). This
is because pigreedy and pi∗ must select the same set of seeds due to the definition of φa. It
follows that
f(pigreedy|φa) + I({v∗})≥ f(pi∗|φa) (3)
Next, consider φb, we have
f(pigreedy|φb) + I({v∗})≥ f(pi[B]|φb)≥ (1− e−1)f(pi∗|φb) (4)
The first inequality is due to the adaptive submodularity of I(·), and the second inequality
is based on Theorem 3. Eqs. (1) and (2) together imply that, under any realization φ:
f(pigreedy|φ) + I({v∗})≥ (1− e−1)f(pi∗|φ)
It follows that
f(pigreedy) + I({v∗})≥ (1− e−1)f(pi∗)
We further have
f(pigreedy) + pv(dmax) · I({v∗})≥ pv(dmax) · (1− e−1)f(pi∗)
Then
max{f(pigreedy), pv(dmax) · I({v∗})} ≥ pv(dmax) · (1− e
−1)
2
· f(pi∗)

Corollary 1. Assume pv∗(dmax) = 1, the enhanced policy pi
enhanced obtains at least (1−
e−1)/2 of the value of the best policy pi∗ for the Adaptive Discount Allocation problem with
the independent cascade model.
f(pienhanced)≥ (1− e
−1)
2
· f(pi∗)
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To further enhance the performance of Algorithm 3, we develop another heuristic as
listed Algorithm 4. Algorithm 4 is a natural extension of Algorithm 3: In case v∗ does not
accept dmax, we remove v
∗ from consideration of initial nodes and apply Algorithm 3 to
the remaining nodes. Otherwise, if v∗ accepts dmax, we update the budget and diffusion
realization, and apply Algorithm 3 to the remaining graph G\dom(ψt) subject to updated
budget. Clearly, the cascade gained from this heuristic is no smaller than the one gained
from Algorithm 3, thus we have
Theorem 5. Algorithm 4 obtains at least pv∗(dmax) · (1− e−1)/2 of the value of the best
policy pi∗ for the Adaptive Discount Allocation problem with the independent cascade model.
Algorithm 4 A Heuristic
1: while V 6= ∅ do
2: Let v∗ = arg maxv∈V IG\dom(ψt)(v);
3: if pv∗(dmax) · I({v∗})> f(pigreedy|ψt) then
4: offer dmax to v
∗
5: if v∗ accepts dmax then
6: S ←S ∪ 〈v∗, dmax〉; update the diffusion realization to ψt+1;
7: else
8: V ← V \ {v∗};ψt+1←ψt
9: else
10: call pigreedy on G \dom(ψt); break
11: return S
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